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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court is fond of saying that "the right to exclude
others" is "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that
are commonly characterized as property."' I shall argue in this Essay
that the right to exclude others is more than just "one of the most
essential" constituents of property-it is the sine qua non. Give someone the right to exclude others from a valued resource, i.e., a resource
that is scarce relative to the human demand for it, and you give them
property. Deny someone the exclusion right and they do not have
property.
Of course, those who are given the right to exclude others from a
valued resource typically also are given other rights with respect to
the resource-such as the rights to consume it, to transfigure it, to
transfer it, to bequeath or devise it, to pledge it as collateral, to subdivide it into smaller interests, and so forth. These other rights are obviously valuable and important, and it is not improper to speak of
© Copyright held by the
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John Paul Stevens Professor of Law, Northwestern University. The author
would like to thank Jim Speta, Henry Smith, and David Van Zandt for helpful
discussions and comments.
1. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979). These words have been
quoted in numerous subsequent decisions. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512
U.S. 374, 384 (1994); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1044 (1992); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987).
*
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them as part of the standard package of legal rights enjoyed by property owners in most contexts. My claim is simply that in demarcating
the line between "property" and "nonproperty"-or "unowned things"
(like the air in the upper atmosphere or the resources of the ocean
beyond a certain distance from shore)-the right to exclude others is a
necessary and sufficient condition of identifying the existence of property. Whatever other sticks may exist in a property owner's bundle of
rights in any given context, these other rights are purely contingent in
terms of whether we speak of the bundle as property. The right to
exclude is in this sense fundamental to the concept of property.
Understanding the role the right to exclude plays in defining property is important for several reasons. First, having a better grasp of
the critical features of property may promote a clearer understanding
of the often-arcane legal doctrine that surrounds this institution. Second, understanding the domain of property is an important preliminary step in developing a justification or critique of property from the
perspective of distributive justice. Third, formulating a more precise
conception of property may be necessary in order to offer a complete
account of constitutional provisions like the Due Process Clause and
the Takings Clause that protect "property." In any event, for those
who have devoted themselves to teaching the law of property, the
question is one of intrinsic interest, whether or not it has any payoff in
resolving more immediate concerns.
In Part II of the Essay, I will locate the role that the right to exclude others plays in the larger debate about the meaning of property.
In Part III, I will offer three arguments why the right to excludewhat I will sometimes call the "gatekeeper right"-should be given
primary place in defining property. In Part IV, I offer some qualifications to my thesis.
II.

THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE AND THE CONCEPT
OF PROPERTY

Within the existing literature about the institution of property,
there is a broad consensus about several propositions. This consensus
does not extend, however, to the precise role that the right to exclude
plays in defining that institution. I will briefly enumerate the principal points of consensus, and then turn to the disagreement over how
to characterize the role of the right to exclude.
A.

Points of Consensus

First, nearly everyone agrees that the institution of property is not
concerned with scarce resources themselves ("things"), but rather with
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the rights of persons with respect to such resources. 2 A copy of Tom
Wolfe's latest novel sitting in a bookshop is a scarce resource. But
considered solely as an object, it is not property. The book can be
characterized as property only by invoking certain rights that persons
have with respect to it. For example, the book might be said to be the
property of the bookshop, meaning that the bookshop has certain
rights with respect to the control and disposition of it. Or the book
might be said to be the property of a customer who has purchased it
from the bookshop, in which case the customer would have certain
rights with respect to the control and disposition of it.
Similarly, there is a consensus that the concept of property includes the rights of persons with respect to both tangible and intangible resources. Most people understand, at least in some dim fashion,
that Tom Wolfe has something called a "copyright" in the contents of
the book he has written, and that this copyright is Wolfe's property.
They understand this to mean that Wolfe has certain rights with respect to reproduction of the book, and that these rights are separate
and distinct from the rights that exist with respect to particular physical copies of the book.
There is also a consensus that property means something different
than mere possession. In both lay and legal understanding, to speak
of possession of scarce resources is to make a statement of fact about
which persons are in control of particular resources. 3 Property, in
contrast, refers not to a statement of fact but to a norm (or norms).
Thus, if I pick up a copy of Tom Wolfe's book in the bookstore and start
to read it, I can be said to be in possession of the book. But I cannot be
said to own it; it is the property of the bookshop until I pay for it.
Moreover, it is understood that property rights generally trump possessory rights.4 After reading the Tom Wolfe novel in the bookshop
for 15 minutes, the shopkeeper may ask me either to buy it or put it
2. This is not to deny that in common parlance "property" is sometimes used to refer
to things, as in the sentence: "The real estate agent agreed to show us the property." It is also true that "property" is sometimes used as a synonym for wealth or
net worth, as in the sentence: "She is a woman of property." My concern here,
however, is with explicating the concept of property as a social institution, i.e.,
with the institution of ownership, as in the sentence: "I'm sorry, but I think that
umbrella you are taking is my property."
3. This is not to deny that there will be disputes over who is in possession of a
resource, and that the actions that signify possession will vary according to social
convention. See Carol M. Rose, Possessionas the Originof Property, 52 U. CHI. L.
REv. 73 (1985). Nor is it to deny that legally significant distinctions will attach to
different types of possession, such as good faith possession (thinking that one is
the owner of a resource or that it is unowned) or bad faith possession (knowing
that one is not the owner of a resource). See Thomas W. Merrill, PropertyRules,
Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 1122 (1984-1985).
4. There are important exceptions to this generalization, such as adverse
possession.
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down. The shopkeeper is entitled to make this demand, since the
bookshop has a property right in the book superior to my possession of
it.
Given that property is a norm, there is also a consensus that property cannot exist without some institutional structure that stands
ready to enforce it. The usual assumption is that this institution is
the state. But it is also possible that it is meaningful to speak of property rights in contexts governed by less formal enforcement mechanisms, such as social ostracism. Thus, it may be possible to speak of
property rights in library carrels, or in particular bedrooms in homes,
where it is understood that certain persons have normative claims to
these scarce resources and that these claims will be enforced by the
common consent of those who participate in a particular social unit.5
With respect to most controversies of concern to lawyers, however,
property rights "are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source
such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits."6
Finally, there is a consensus that the concept of property is not
limited to private property, but includes also what may be called common property and public property. 7 Private property may be said to
exist where one person or a small number of persons (including corporations and not-for-profit organizations) have certain rights with respect to valuable resources. Common property may be said to exist
where all qualified members of a particular group or community have
equal rights to valuable resources. An example would be a common
pasture open to all members of a particular village for the grazing of
livestock. Public property may be said to exist where governmental
entities have certain rights with respect to valuable resources, analogous to the rights of private property owners. An example would be a
municipal airport.
In sum, there is a general consensus that property refers to particular rights of persons or entities with respect to scarce tangible and
intangible resources; that property is distinct from and superior to the
mere possession of resources; that the rights associated with property
require some institutional structure that stands ready to enforce these
rights; and that property may be private, common, or public.
5. See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1372, 1394-95

(1993).
6. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
7. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of PropertyRights, 57 Ai. EcoN. REv.,
May 1967, at 347, 354 (Papers and Proceedings of the Seventy-ninth Annual
Meeting of the American Economic Association); C.B. Macpherson, The Meaning
ofProperty, in PROPERTY:
msATREAI AND CRITICAL POSITIONS 1, 9-11 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1978).
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Three Schools of Thought Regarding the Right to
Exclude

There is, however, much less consensus regarding the nature and
content of the particular rights that persons have when they are said
to have property. In particular, although it is widely agreed that
someone who has property in a resource typically will have at least
some right to exclude others from using or interfering with that resource, there is disagreement about how central this right is to the
understanding of property. Generally speaking, it is possible to identify three different intellectual traditions regarding the role of the
right to exclude. These may be called "single-variable essentialism,"
"multiple-variable essentialism," and "nominalism."
Probably the oldest continuing tradition in attempts to define property is essentialism-the search for the critical element or elements
that make up the irreducible core of property in all its manifestations.
The patron saint of property essentialism is William Blackstone, the
first full-time law professor at an English-speaking university. In
fact, Blackstone endorsed not one but two essentialist definitions of
property, corresponding to what I call the single-variable and the multiple-variable versions.
The first or single-variable version of essentialism posits that the
right to exclude others is the irreducible core attribute of property.
Thus, Blackstone I:
There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and engages the
affections of mankind, as the right of property; or that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the
8
world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.

Under this conception, the right to exclude ("sole and despotic dominion") is both a necessary and sufficient condition of property.
Many other scholars in succeeding generations, including Jeremy
Bentham, 9 have also appeared to endorse some such notion.lO Per8. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *2.
9. See JEREmy BENTHAM, Idea of a Complete Law, in OF LAws IN GENERAL 156, 177
(H.L.A. Hart ed., 1970).
10. Two recent and excellent philosophical monographs give primacy to the right to
exclude in explicating the concept of property. See J.W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND
JUSTICE (1996); J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAw (1997). I cannot do
full justice to the subtle and sophisticated arguments these authors present.
Roughly speaking, however, Penner argues that "the right to property is a right
to exclude others from things which is grounded by the interest we have in the
use of things," adding nevertheless that "the law of property is driven by an analysis which takes the perspective of exclusion, rather than one which elaborates a
right to use." Id. at 71. Thus, with qualifications, Penner seems to fall more
within the single-variable essentialism camp than in any other. For his part,
Harris argues that "for general theoretical purposes, 'property' should be conceived of as comprising items which are either the subject of direct trespassory
protection or separately assignable as parts of private wealth." HARRIS, supra,at
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haps the best-known exposition of this perspective was provided by
the philosopher and New Deal lawyer Felix Cohen. His posthumously-published Socratic dialogue on the nature of private propertyll considers a number of attributes commonly associated with
property, and through the positing of examples and counterexamples
concludes that only the right to exclude is invariably connected with
all forms of property. Cohen vividly summarizes his discussion in a
manner suitable for memorialization on the blackboard:
Mhat is property to which the following label can be attached:
To the world: Keep offX unless you have my permission, which I may grant or

withhold.
Signed:

Private citizen

Endorsed:

The state.

12

Single-variable essentialism also finds extensive if somewhat qualified support in the decisions of the contemporary U.S. Supreme
Court. The Court has said of the right to exclude that it is "universally held to be a fundamental element of the property right;"'13 that it
is "one of the most essential rights" of property;1 4 and that it is "one of
the most treasured" rights of property.' 5 Although all these statements imply that the right to exclude is not the only right associated
with property, no other right has been singled out for such extravagant endorsement by the Court. Moreover, the Court's decisions suggest that governmental interference with the right to exclude is more
likely to be considered a taking of property without compensation
under the Fifth Amendment than are interferences with other tradi16
tional elements of property.

11.

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

13. Since he regards trespassory protection of scarce resources as foundational to
the understanding of property, Harris also would appear to be a qualified proponent of what I call single-variable essentialism.
See Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REv. 357
(1954)[hereinafier Cohen, Dialogueon PrivateProperty]. Cohen's conclusion that
property has an essential core of meaning is particularly striking in light of the
fact that Cohen was also the author of a famous plea for functional rather than
formalistic reasoning in law. See Felix Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense and the
FunctionalApproach, 35 CoLum. L. REv. 809 (1935).
Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property,supra note 11, at 374.
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979).
See sources cited supra note 1.
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982).
See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1011 (1984); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. at 435; Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. at 179-80. In
certain circumstances, the Court has held that interference with the right to exclude does not constitute a taking. For example, the Court has upheld a state
constitutional rule prohibiting owners of shopping centers from excluding individuals who seek to exercise free speech rights on shopping center property. See
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The second version of essentialism, also found in Blackstone, posits
that the essence of property lies not just in the right to exclude others,
but in a larger set of attributes or incidents, of which the right to exclude is just one. Thus, Blackstone II: "The third absolute right, inherent in every Englishman, is that of property: which consists in the
free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any
control or diminution, save only by the laws of the land."17 This version of essentialism holds that property is defined by multiple attributes or incidents. Blackstone describes these multiple attributes as
the rights of "free use, enjoyment, and disposal." Curiously, the right
to exclude others-which as we have seen is elsewhere deemed by
Blackstone to be the defining element of property-fails to make an
appearance on this list. Moreover, it would seem that the rights of
"free use" and "enjoyment" are arguably redundant, or at least largely
overlapping. But these anomalies have been overlooked in subsequent
accounts, which have translated the Blackstonian trilogy as the rights
of "possession, use, and disposition,"18 or alternatively, the rights to
exclude, to use or enjoy, and to transfer.
Under the multiple-variable version of essentialism, the right to
exclude is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of property. Without the right to exclude, there is no property. But more than the right
to exclude is needed in order to create a package of rights sufficiently
impressive to be called property.
This multiple-variable essentialism has also been defended by
later generations of commentators. 1 9 The most elaborate of these efforts is that of Tony Honore, an Oxford legal scholar, who sought to
identify the "standard incidents of ownership" that are present when
20
an individual is the "full owner" in a mature, liberal legal system.
He concluded that there are eleven such incidents: (1) the right to possess; (2) the right to use; (3) the right to manage; (4) the right to the
PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). But it has explained this
result on the ground that "the owner had not exhibited an interest in excluding
all persons from his property." Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 U.S. at 434. So explained, it would appear that the Court regards such cases
more as regulations of the use of property than as restrictions on the right to
exclude. In other words, the regulation is seen as mediating a conflict over the
use of the property that arises between the owner and the entrant after the
owner has agreed to waive the right to exclude. See also Yee v. City of Escondido,
503 U.S. 519 (1992); FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245 (1987).
17. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND *138.
18. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 58-59 (1985).
19. Including Professor Epstein. See id. at 165.
20. See TONY HONOP8, Ownership, in MAKING LAw BIND 161, 161-192 (1987). The
essay originally appeared in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107-47 (A.G.

Guest ed., 1961). See also Frank Snare, The Concept of Property,9 AM. PHIL. Q.
200 (1972).
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income of the thing; (5) the right to the capital; (6) the right to security; (7) the incident of transmissibility; (8) the incident of absence of
term; (9) the duty to prevent harm; (10) liability to execution; and (11)
the incident of residuarity. Honore conceded that not all of these incidents are present in all cases in which we speak of property. But they
represent the paradigm of full ownership, against which various types
of incomplete or partial ownership must be understood.
Multiple-variable essentialism also finds some support in the
Supreme Court's decisions. On several occasions, the Court has stated
that "[plroperty rights in a physical thing have been described as the
rights 'to possess, use and dispose of it."'21 This of course is the modern variant on Blackstone's original trilogy of rights.
The third school, which I call nominalism, views property as a
purely conventional concept with no fixed meaning-an empty vessel
that can be filled by each legal system in accordance with its peculiar
values and beliefs. On this view, the right to exclude is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition of property. It may be a feature commonly associated with property, but its presence is not essential; it is
entirely optional. A legal system can label as property anything it
wants to.
Although traces of the nominalist conception can be found in the
Nineteenth Century, 22 it is basically a product of the Legal Realist
movement of the Twentieth. For the Realists, property was not defined by a single right or definitive trilogy of rights. Rather it is a
"bundle of rights." Moreover, this bundle has no fixed core or constituent elements. It is susceptible of an infinite number of variations, as
different "sticks" or "strands" are expanded or diminished, added to or
removed from the bundle altogether. Thus, the Realists understood
that the universe of things called property is purely a matter of social
convention. Perhaps the most influential figure in the development of
the nominalist perspective was Wesley Hohfeld.23 Although Hohfeld
apparently never used the bundle of rights metaphor,24 his analysis of
legal concepts as a series of bipolar "jural relations" laid the ground21. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982)(quoting United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945)); see also
Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 118 S. Ct. 1925, 1933 (1998); Ruckelshaus
v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003 (1984).
22. Thus, Henry Clay once said: That is property which the law declares to be property." 8 THE WoRKs OF HENRY CLAY 152 (Calvin Colton ed., 1904), quoted in J.
GORDON HYLTON ET AL., PROPERTY LAW AND THE PUBLIc INTEREST 68 (1998).
23. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, FundamentalLegal Conceptions asApplied in JudicialReasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 746-47 (1917).
24. See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COI%ODITY & PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF
PROPERTY IN AAIERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776-1970, at 319, 322 & 455 n.40
(1997). Alexander reports that the first use of the metaphor was in a treatise on
eminent domain published in 1888. See id. at 455 n.40 (citing JOHN LEwIs, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EINNENT DoMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES 43 (1888)).
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work for a conception of property as a collection of socially-contingent
entitlements.
Subsequent Legal Realist scholars took Hohfeld's jural relations
and derived from it an extreme form of nominalism. As one Realist
writer, Walter Hamilton, stated in an entry on "Property" in the 1937
edition of the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, property is nothing
more than "a euphonious collection of letters which serves as a general
term for the miscellany of equities that persons hold in the commonwealth."25 The American Law Institute's Restatement of Property,
published in 1936, adopted a similarly open-ended definition of
26
property.
This sort of extreme nominalism continues to be found in contemporary writing about property. For example, in an influential essay,
Thomas Grey has argued that the concept of property has so many
27
variations and specialized uses that its meaning has "disintegrated."
He concludes, in keeping with the skeptical position of the Realists,
that "the specialists who design and manipulate the legal structures of
the advanced capitalist economies could easily do without using the
s
term 'property' at all."2
Today, the nominalist conception is more-or-less the orthodox understanding of property within the American legal community. Law
students have been instructed for years that the bundle of rights met29
aphor accurately captures the nature of the institution of property.
The Supreme Court has also jumped on the nominalist bandwagon,
and has on many occasions itself described property in terms of the
bundle of rights metaphor 3O (albeit often in a context where the Court

25. 11 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 528 (1937), quoted in HYLTON, supra
note 22, at 68.
26. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 10 (1936)("The word 'owner,' as it is used in this
Restatement, means the person who has one or more interests.").
27. See Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegrationof Property, in PROPERTY: NoMoS XXII
69 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980).
28. Id. at 73.
29. See BRUCE A. ACKERmAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 26-29 (1977).

Ackerman reports that the consensus is so pervasive "even the dimmest law student can be counted upon to parrot the ritual phrases on command." Id. at 26.
30. The clearest example where the "bundle" metaphor served to justify uncompensated regulation of property occurred in Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979),
where the Court rejected a takings challenge to a federal statute that prohibited
the sale of bald eagle feathers. The Court stated: "[Tihe denial of one traditional
property right does not always amount to a taking. At least where an owner
possesses a full 'bundle' of property rights, the destruction of one 'strand' of the
bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety." Id.
at 65-66.
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also says that the right to exclude is "among the most essential" of the
bundled rights3l).
These three schools of thought-single-variable essentialism, multiple-variable essentialism, and nominalism-do not exhaust the possibilities with respect to understanding of the nature of property. One
of the most sophisticated modern expositions of property by a philosopher is that of Jeremy Waldron. 3 2 Borrowing a distinction developed
by Ronald Dworkin, Waldron argues that private property is best understood as a general "concept," of which the various incidents or elements catalogued by Honore and others embody different
"conceptions." He defines the general concept of private property
as
the understanding that, "in the case of each object, the individual person whose name is attached to that object is to determine how the
object shall be used and by whom. His decision is to be upheld by the
society as final."33 This general concept, Waldron argues, takes on different conceptions in different contexts, depending on the type of resource involved, the traditions of the legal system, whether ownership
is unified or divided, and so forth. For example, agricultural land may
be subject to different types of restrictions on use than is personal
property.
From the vantage point of this essay, Waldron's account can be
seen as a combination of single-variable essentialism and nominalism.
His definition of the core concept of private property-giving a named
individual "final" authority to determine how resources "shall be used
and by whom"-bears a strong family resemblance to Blackstone's
sole and despotic right to exclude. Waldron would not define property
solely in terms of this feature, however, but depicts property as
morphing into a variety of conceptions in a manner consistent with
the bundle of rights metaphor associated with nominalism. For example, he argues that the right of inheritance is entirely contingent and
that one could have a system of private property with or without inheritance, without affecting the conclusion that the system was still
one of private property.34
31. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982); Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).
32. See Jeremy Waldron, What is Private Property?, 5 OxFoPn J. LEGAL STUD. 313
(1985)[hereinafter Waldron, What is Private Property?]. A condensed version of
this essay appears in JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 26-61

(1988).
33. Waldron, What is PrivateProperty?,supra note 32, at 327. Waldron develops this
concept by contrasting private property to collective (i.e., state-owned) property
and common property (which he equates to unowned things). Thus, his core concept does not generalize to all forms of property.
34. See id. at 337-40. Waldron hints at one point that the right to transfer has a
"tightness of connection" to the core concept that distinguishes it from other incidents like inheritance. See id. at 341. This concession points arguably toward a
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THE PRIMACY OF THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE

Single-variable essentialism-the view that the right to exclude
others from valued resources is both a necessary and sufficient condition of property-has few defenders in today's American legal community. 35 Nevertheless, I think that three different types of argument
can be advanced in support of this understanding. These are (1) a
logical or conceptual argument, (2) an historical argument, and (3) an
argument from existing legal usage and practice.
A.

The Logical Primacy of the Right to Exclude

The first argument in support of an essentialist definition of property centered on the right to exclude is basically a logical one. It goes
like this: if one starts with the right to exclude, it is possible to derive
most of the other attributes commonly associated with property
through the addition of relatively minor clarifications about the domain of the exclusion right. On the other hand, if one starts with any
other attribute of property, one cannot derive the right to exclude by
extending the domain of that other attribute; rather, one must add the
right to exclude as an additional premise. This mental exercise
strongly suggests that the right to exclude is fundamental to our understanding of property.
To illustrate, consider resources in land-the proverbial Blackacre.
Let us start with the understanding that A has the right to exclude
others from Blackacre. This means, in effect, that A has the power to
act as the gatekeeper of Blackacre. 36 A can forbid other persons from
entering onto Blackacre or from causing structures or objects to encroach on Blackacre; alternatively, A can consent to other persons entering onto or encroaching on Blackacre. As Blackacre's gatekeeper, A
has the power to determine who has access to Blackacre and on what
terms.3 7
partial embrace of what I have called multiple variable essentialism. So perhaps
Waldron's account can be seen as a blending or merging of all three schools I have

identified.
35. Outside that community, it is possible that a revival of single-variable essentialism may be afoot. See supra note 10 (noting recent works by Penner and Harris
which are primarily philosophical and are written from the perspective of the
English and Commonwealth legal systems rather than the American).
36. J.E. Penner adopts a similar metaphor:
The right to property is like a gate, not a wall. The right to property
permits the owner not only to make solitary use of his property, by excluding all others, but also permits him to make a social use of his property, by selectively excluding others, which is to say by selectively
allowing some to enter.
PENNER, supra note 10, at 74.
37. The law has conventionally spoken of this as a right of exclusive "possession." I
will avoid this locution because "possession" is a slippery term. We can be more
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If we start by giving A the right to exclude with respect to Blackacre, then the other attributes conventionally associated with property can be derived simply by adding some minor qualifications about
the domain of this right. Let us consider four of the most important
attributes commonly associated with property besides the right to exclude: the right to use, the right to transfigure (i.e., develop), the right
to transfer during life, and the right to devise upon death.
1. The right to use. If A has the right to exclude with respect to
Blackacre, it would seem but a very small step from this to conclude
that A also has the right to determine the use of Blackacre. If A can
exclude B,C,D,... N from Blackacre, then A is in a position to determine that no one other than A or those given permission by A may
enter onto Blackacre or encroach on Blackacre. A's power as gatekeeper thus allows A to determine who may remain on Blackacre and
what activities they may engage in there. In short, A's right to exclude with respect to Blackacre leads directly to A's right to dictate the
uses of Blackacre, because no one else will be in a position to interfere
with the particular uses designated by A.
It does not follow from this that the right to use is coterminous
with the right to exclude. The two rights can be severed. Thus A,
while retaining the right to exclude, may contractually assign the
right to use to another, as by entering into a negative easement or
covenant promising not to engage in particular uses on Blackacre. An
example would be a covenant promising to use Blackacre for single
family residential purposes only. Or the state may adopt a law that
preserves the right to exclude but takes away the right to use. Zoning
and other types of land use controls are familiar examples.
These examples of severance, however, only suggest that in special
circumstances the right to exclude does not entail the right to engage
in particular uses.3 8 They do not detract from the basic point that in
the ordinary course of events, giving A the right to exclude with respect to Blackacre leads directly to the conclusion that A has the right
to use Blackacre. In other words, one need not add a new power to A
to get from the right to exclude to the right to use; one need only show
that some special servitude or police power regulation does not exist
that takes away a particular right to use that otherwise would flow
from the right to exclude.
precise by thinking of the right to exclude simply as a gatekeeper power-the
right to determine who has access to particular resources and on what terms.
38. As Felix Cohen pointed out, there are also circumstances where a corporation
may be able to exercise the exclusion right, but cannot in any realistic sense use
the resources itself. The example he gave was a song: a corporation can own the
copyright to a song, and hence can exclude others from performing or copying it;
but the corporation cannot itself sing the song. See Cohen, Dialogue on Private
Property,supra note 11, at 369.
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2. The Right to Transfigure. Essentially the same analysis applies
to the right to transfigure, i.e., A's right to clear the land, till the soil,
plant and harvest crops, construct new structures, tear down old ones,
and so forth on Blackacre. A's power to act as gatekeeper to Blackacre
allows A to prevent others from interfering with A's efforts to transfigure Blackacre in these and other ways. The power to exclude thus
leads inexorably to the power to transfigure.
Again as in the case of the right to use, it is possible to sever the
right to exclude from the right to transfigure. Negative easements
and covenants are one way in which this can be done. An extreme
example would be a conservation servitude, permitted by statute in
most states, 3 9 that would prohibit any development of Blackacre. But
the major source of severance here is undoubtedly local building codes,
zoning ordinances, historical preservation measures, and the like. In
the famous Penn Central case, 40 for example, the City of New York
ruled that the owners of the Penn Central Station could not develop
the air rights above the station. 4 ' Under this order, the owners presumably still had the right to exclude others from encroaching on their
air rights. But they could not use the air rights for new development.
Indeed, the legislative severance of the right to transfigure can become quite extreme, as in the British statute of 1947 that effectively
transferred all development rights from private property owners to
the State, requiring each property owner to obtain special permission
42
from local authorities before engaging in any construction.
As in the case of restrictions on uses, however, these legislative
restrictions on the right to transfigure should be seen as exceptions to
the rule that would otherwise obtain. Even in the extreme form of
Britain's nationalization of development rights, the changed understanding applies only to a subset of transfigurations-the construction
of new structures. It does not extend to decisions about agricultural or
horticultural uses. And even such an extreme severance does not challenge the proposition that absent some such governmental intervention, the right to exclude would ordinarily lead directly to a right to
transfigure.
3. The right to transferduring life. Once A has the right to exclude
with respect to Blackacre, A also has the right to transfer Blackacre
during his natural life, if we add one relatively modest clarification
about the domain of the right to exclude. That clarification is that the
39. See Gerald Korngold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes: A PolicyAnalysis
in the Context of In Gross Real Covenants and Easements, 63 TEX. L. Rav. 433,
437 (1984).
40. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
41. See id. at 116.
42. See ROBERT E. MEGARRY & H.W.R. WADE, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 1065, 1074
(5th ed. 1984).
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right to exclude must encompass not only the owner's right to include
others, but also to exclude him or herself.43 A transfer of property is
simply an irrevocable agreement to give permanent access to the resource to another combined with an irrevocable agreement to exclude
oneself from access to the resource. Thus, as long as the gatekeeper
power is understood to include putting oneself outside the gate and
installing someone else as the gatekeeper, the right to exclude leads
directly to the right to transfer.
Once again, severance of the right to exclude and the right to
transfer is possible. Under the common law, direct restraints on the
power of alienation of a fee simple are strongly disfavored. But lesser
property interests, such as leaseholds, can be made inalienable if the
landlord expressly so provides in the lease. Legislative restrictions on
transfer are relatively rare, but the Supreme Court has upheld a federal statute prohibiting persons from selling-but not from possessing
or using-bald eagle feathers.44 These examples show that in exceptional circumstances the right to transfer can be severed from the
right to exclude. But they also show that the ordinary understanding
is that a person who has the right to exclude also is presumed to have
the right to transfer. It takes some special conveyance or legislation
to defeat the expectation that the right to exclude entails a right to
transfer.
4. The right to devise upon death. The analysis of transfers upon
death closely tracks that of transfers during life. In order to derive
such a right from the right to exclude, we need to add only the clarification that the domain of the owner's right to exclude encompasses
the right to direct who shall be included and excluded upon the death
of the owner. This is a clarification of the temporal domain of the
right to exclude, rather than (as in the case of inter vivos transfers) a
clarification about the universe of persons who may be excluded. In
order to show that the right to exclude entails the right to devise upon
death, it is necessary to specify that the owner's directions regarding
who is to be included and excluded will be respected beyond the instant of the owner's death up to time of the probate of the owner's last
will and testament (or the equivalent event). This clarification, like
the previous one, entails at most a very modest extension of the domain of the right to exclude.
As we have seen with respect to the other incidents of ownership,
the right to devise upon death can be severed from the right to ex43. PENNER, supra note 10, at 80-97, makes a similar and much more elaborate argument. Interestingly, he concludes that the right to make gifts of property can be
deduced from the right to exclude; but he argues that the right to sell property
requires the conjunction of two rights: the right of property, i.e., the right to
exclude, and the right to contract.
44. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
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clude. The state can impose restrictions on inheritance, such as the
formal requirements of the Wills Act, forced spousal share statutes,
and the rule against perpetuities. On rare occasions, we also find legislation seeking to abrogate the right to inherit outright. The most
prominent example is the Indian Land Consolidation Act,45 which
seeks to forbid the inheritance of very small interests in Indian Tribal
lands in an effort to promote the consolidation of these lands into more
economically viable parcels. The Supreme Court has twice held this
statute unconstitutional, 4 6 underscoring that these efforts at severance, although conceptually possible, are clearly exceptional. The ordinary understanding is that the right to exclude encompasses also
the right to transfer upon death.
In short, if we start with the right to exclude, it is possible with
very minor clarifications to derive deductively the other major incidents that have been associated with property. However, the converse
is not true: we cannot start with any of the other incidents, and reason backwards to derive the right to exclude. In each case, it is necessary to posit independently that the right to exclude exists with
respect to the resources in question.
Consider, first, the right to use. There is no question that this
right is an important attribute of property closely associated with the
right to exclude. At its core, the gatekeeper right is the right to determine the use of resources, by exercising the power of exclusion and
inclusion. But the right to exclude cannot be derived from the right to
use. This can be shown by the example of nonpossessory property
rights, such as easements, profits, and real covenants. Nonpossessory
property rights are rights to engage in enumerated uses of resources,
such as crossing the land of another or gathering timber on the land of
another. Yet one can engage in most of these uses without having a
property right to do so. A use-right that does not rise to the dignity of
a property right is called a license. And what is the defining difference
between use-rights in the form of licenses and use-rights that are considered nonpossessory property rights? The difference is that the
holder of a nonpossessory property right can exclude others (including
but not limited to the grantor) from interfering with the exercise of the
use-right, whereas the holder of a license lacks such a right. In other
words, the feature that makes nonpossessory property rights property
is the right to exclude others, and the right to exclude cannot be derived from the right to use.
Compare in this regard the difference between my use of the office
I occupy at the law school and my use of the office in my house. I
engage in similar uses of both resources-reading, typing at a word
45. 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 2201-2211 (1998).
46. See Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234 (1997); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
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processor, talking on the telephone. But the former use-right is based
on a license derived from my employment, while the latter is based on
my ownership of the house. Because it is only a license, my right to
use the office at the law school can be terminated by the university at
any time. However ill-advised such a move might be from an employee-relations perspective, I would have no legal grounds for blocking the decision. In contrast, neither the university nor any one else
can put me out of the office at my house. Any attempt to oust me in
this context could be countered with a panoply of potent legal remedies. Thus, we cannot deduce my right to exclude from the fact of my
right of use, whereas, as we have seen, it is easy to move in the opposite direction.
Similar points can be made about the right to transfer. Fiduciaries
of various sorts have the right to transfer resources, without any attendant right to use the resources themselves or to exclude at their
discretion others from using them. Examples include the officers of
business corporations, the trustees of foundations, and politicians
having the power to tax and spend. To determine whether or not
someone who has the right to transfer resources also has a general
right to exclude others from the resources, we need to know additional
information about the scope of their powers, specifically, whether they
are owners. The right to transfer, by itself, cannot lead us to this further information about which incidents of property the transferor
enjoys.
I will not belabor the analysis further, since the general point
should be clear: start with the right to exclude, and it is easy to derive
with minor clarifications most of the other incidents of ownership commonly listed as being part of the concept of "full ownership." Start
with any other incident, and one cannot reason back to the right to
exclude, without introducing the right to exclude as an independent
premise.
B. The Historical Primacy of the Right to Exclude
The second argument in support of the primacy of the right to exclude is historical in nature. There is strong evidence that, with respect to interests in land, the right to exclude is the first right to
emerge in primitive property rights systems. Only as property systems evolve in complexity and sophistication do other rights, such as
the rights of transfer, inheritance, pledging as collateral, subdivision,
and so forth, develop. The fact that the right to exclude can be found
in even the most primitive land-rights systems provides further support for the conclusion that the gatekeeper right provides the key to
understanding the nature of property.
It is commonly believed that the most elementary form of property
right in land is the usufruct, an exclusive right to engage in particular
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uses of the land that is nontransferable and that terminates when the
owner dies or ceases the use.4 7 What distinguishes usufructuary

rights from unowned resources is not the right to use the resource, but
rather the right to exclude others from engaging in particular uses of
the resource.
Whether usufructs were in fact the first form of property rights is
something which cannot be known with complete certainty. However,
Robert Ellickson, who has conducted a wide-ranging comparative
study of property rights in land, concludes that the usufruct is most
likely the first form of property in land:
Anthropological evidence suggests that during the first 300,000 years of the
evolution of our species (homo sapiens), people lived in hunter-gatherer bands
that moved nomadically as local food sources became exhausted. Then, about
10,000 years ago, prehistoric civilization achieved a great breakthrough. In
the Fertile Crescent of the Near East, human groups, which had shortly
before begun operating out of permanent settlements, mastered the skills of
cultivating crops and domesticating animals. This breakthrough required innovations not only in husbandry, but also in property rights. A prehistoric
community had to develop a set of land rules that provided incentives for its
and animals.
members to engage in the small events involved in raising crops
48
The Promethean invention was likely the classic usufruct.

William Cronon, who has published an influential account of the
property rights recognized by the Native Americans in colonial New
England, 4 9 reaches a similar conclusion:
Southern New England Indian families enjoyed exclusive use of their planting
fields and of the land on which their wigwams stood, and so might be said to
have "owned" them. But neither of these were permanent possessions. Wigwams were moved every few months, and planting fields were abandoned af-

ter a number of years. Once abandoned, a field returned to brush until it was
recleared by someone else, and no effort was made to set permanent boundaries around it that would hold it indefinitely for a single person. What families possessed in their fields was the use of them, the crops that were produced

by a woman's labor upon them. When lands were traded or sold.., what were
exchanged were usufruct rights, acknowledgments by one group that another
might use an area for planting or hunting or gathering. Such rights were
limited to the period of use, and they did not include many of the privileges
Europeans commonly associated with ownership: a user could not (and saw
no need to) prevent other village members from trespassing or gathering nonfood on such lands, and had no conception of deriving rent from
agricultural
50
them.

If we assume that the earliest form of property in land was the
usufruct, this provides additional support for the claim that the right
to exclude is foundational to the understanding of property. The usufruct, as both Ellickson and Cronon emphasize, is essentially a time47. See Ellickson, supra note 5, at 1364.
48. Id. at 1365 (footnotes omitted).
49. See WILLIAM CRONON, CHANGES IN THE LAND:
OGY OF NEW ENGLAND (1983).

50. Id. at 62.

INDIANS, COLONISTS, AND THE
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limited right to exclude others from interfering with particular uses of
resources (such as growing crops or placing wigwams on land). Insofar as these sorts of usufructuary rights are acknowledged to be a rudimentary form of property rights, this suggests that giving an
individual or small group the right to exclude others from particular
uses of land is sufficient to create something identifiable as property.
Certainly, it suggests that other attributes associated with "full ownership" in mature property systems-such as the rights to transfer
during life and upon death and to borrow against property-are not
necessary conditions of property.
Perhaps more significantly, this historical evidence suggests that
the right to exclude, because it was the first right to evolve in time, is
more basic to the institution of property than are other incidents of
property recognized in mature property systems. It appears the first
step in the evolution of property rights in land was the recognition of
the right to exclude; once this was established, then and only then was
it possible to add other rights to the bundle.
C.

The Ubiquity of the Right to Exclude

The third argument looks to existing legal practices in a mature
legal system to discern whether the right to exclude is invariably associated with those interests identified as property rights. Here too we
find that, by and large, where the law recognizes a right to property, it
confers a right to exclude. The same cannot be said for the other incidents or attributes of property identified by Honore and others as part
of the standard bundle of rights. As befits an inductive argument, we
find some possible exceptions to the foregoing generalizations. Nevertheless, the pattern is sufficiently widespread that it supports the conclusion that property and the exclusion right go hand-in-hand.
Consider first the various common law estates in land short of the
fee simple absolute (full ownership). All other present possessory estates-the fee tail, the fee simple determinable, the life estate, the
tenancy for years, the periodic tenancy, and even the tenancy at willinclude the right to exclude others so long as the estate remains possessory. Each of these estates is protected by rules of civil and criminal trespass, which give the holder of the present possessory estate
the right to call upon the state to exclude others from unwanted inva1
sions or intrusions.5
Future interests arguably present a more questionable case, because the holder of a future interest typically does not have a right to
exclude with respect to the present uses of the property. A landlord,
for example, cannot tell a tenant (unless this power is reserved in the
51. See HARRIS, supra note 10, at 25; Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass and Nuisance, in 3
THE NEW PALGRAvE DiCToNARY OF EcoNorhcs AND THE LAW 617, 617-22 (1998).
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lease) whom the tenant may exclude from the property or invite on to
the property.5 2 But this "exception" for future interests is not really
an exception at all, because the holder of a future interest by definition only has a property right that takes effect in the future. With
respect to the interest that the future interest holder in fact has, the
right to exclude remains fully applicable. For instance, the landlord
has the right to exclude with respect to his or her reversionary interest. If the tenant holds over, or transfers possession to someone else
who remains in possession after the end of the lease, the landlord can
bring an unlawful detainer action and have the tenant or the third
party evicted. Similarly, the holder of a remainder following a life estate, or the holder of a possibility of reverter or right of entry following
a fee simple determinable, has the right to exclude others from interfering with the vesting of the remainder, reverter, or right of entry, as
the case may be.
Thus, if we attend carefully to the nature of the common law property estate, we find that the right to exclude seems always to accompany the right to property when and if the right becomes possessory.
Indeed, the scope of the right to exclude defines the perimeter of the
right. The same cannot be said of the other incidents. Indeed, some
future interests may never entail any rights of use (because they
never become possessory), and some historically have not been
alienable.
Present but nonpossessory property interests in material resources
are amenable to a similar analysis. Examples include easements, real
covenants, water rights, profits, and so forth. Here too, we find that
although the holder of the interest does not have a general right to
exclude others from defined metes and bounds, such a person is given
a full panoply of legal rights to protect the limited interest that they
have from interference by others.
For example, if the holder of an easement of way is blocked by the
owner of the servient estate (or others) from using the easement, the
easement holder may obtain an injunction against such interference.
The easement holder thus is given a gatekeeper power with respect to
the exercise of his or her limited interest-essentially a right of access. Other incidents of property, such as the rights to consume,
transfigure, or transfer (at least to transfer in gross, i.e., separately
from the dominant estate) are often lacking with respect to easements.
In a similar fashion, the holder of riparian water rights has the right
to enjoin others from diverting water from the basin or from consuming more water than permitted, i.e., to enjoin others from interfering
with the natural flow in a natural flow state or from violating norms of
52. In contrast, the landlord does have some control over the tenant's use of the property, insofar as the landlord can bring an action for waste if the tenant engages in
uses that jeopardize the landlord's reversionary interest.
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reasonable use in a reasonable use jurisdiction. The right to prohibit
interferences by others constitutes a gatekeeper right that in turn defines the perimeter of the riparian right. Other incidents of property,
such as the right to consume, transfigure, or transfer (apart from
transfer of the riparian land), are often lacking in riparian water
rights systems.
The law with respect to intangible rights in intellectual property is,
if anything, even more striking in the degree to which the property
right and the right to exclude go hand-in-hand. Copyrights, patents,
trademarks, and trade secrets are all recognized as intangible forms of
property. In each case, the core of the property right is the right to
exclude others from interfering with or using the right in specified
ways:
[1In the case of all intellectual property some ideational abstraction or other is
made the reference point for trespassory rules which ban some kind of uses of
the abstract entity to all except a privileged proprietor. As with other property, the outer perimeter of ownership5 3interests in intellectual property is
fixed by the relevant trespassory rules.

Focusing on the right to exclude also explains how it is that we
recognize not only private property in scarce resources but also public
property and, in some contexts, common or communal property. Public property is simply property in which the right to exclude is exercised by a designated governmental entity. Take a national park such
as Yellowstone. The National Park Service, a division of the Department of the Interior, administers Yellowstone. It determines who may
enter and on what terms (there is a modest admission fee). It also has
the right to condition entry on certain conduct ("Do Not Feed the
Bears"). In the event of a major fire or other disaster, it may close the
park down altogether. Thus, it is easy to see that the National Park
Service exercises what is in effect a gatekeeper right with respect to
the park. Significantly, however, most of the other incidents associated with private property in land are either severely restricted or
missing. The Park Service is extremely restricted in the uses to which
it may put the land (no clearing the land for crops); it is severely limited in how it transfigures the land (no condos at Old Faithful); it cannot transfer the land; it cannot borrow against the land, etc.
The single strong point of linkage between public property and private property is the fact that in both cases some designated person or
entity exercises a gatekeeper right with respect to the property. This
point of linkage justifies us in calling something like a national park
53. HARms, supranote 10, at 45. The Supreme Court has recognized this point with
respect to trade secrets. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1011
(1984)(0"With respect to a trade secret, the right to exclude others is central to the
very definition of the property interest. Once the data that constitute a trade
secret are disclosed to others, or others are allowed to use those data, the holder
of the trade secret has lost his property interest in the data.").
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public property. All other incidents of private property under conditions of full ownership are either severely restricted or are missing
altogether.
Common property or communal property is trickier, because it is
often confused with unowned resources. Unowned resources are
things like the upper atmosphere and the aquatic life found in the
deep seas. They are unclaimed and uncontrolled by any community
and hence are open to appropriation by any and all. Common property or communal property, in contrast, is best viewed as resources
which are open to appropriation by any qualified member of a designated community. Joint tenancies and tenancies in common can be
seen as a form of small-scale common property. Larger-scale examples would include fishing rights open to any member of a given community or common pasture rights open to all farming families in a
village.
The distinguishing characteristic of common property is that there
is no right to exclude as among the members of the community, but
the community or some designated entity within it exercises a right to
exclude persons outside the community from gaining access to the resource. Thus, the cotenants in a tenancy in common or joint tenancy
cannot exclude each other from full use and enjoyment of the property,
but as to the rest of the world they manage the resource as private
property. In larger-scale forms of common property, the exclusion of
or
outsiders may be exercised through a formal governance structure,
54
it may be manifested only through more informal social norms.
From an economic perspective, large-scale common or community
property will often be subject to a dynamic (called the "tragedy of the
commons"55) that is indistinguishable from unowned resources. But
the critical point for present purposes is that there is a justification for
referring to such common or communal property as property which
does not exist in the case of unowned resources. Common or community property is not truly unowned, because there is a designated entity-the community-that exercises the right to exclude outsiders
with respect to these resources. The existence of this right to exclude
is the one significant linkage between private property and common or
community property. The other incidences, as in the case of public
property, may exist only in a highly attenuated form or not at all.
Another potential challenge to the primacy of the right to exclude
comes from some of the most quintessential interests of the modern
capitalist state-bank accounts, bonds, commercial paper, common
stock, and the like. These interests, which legally are sometimes
54. See generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COammONS: THE EVOLUTION OF IN-

STITUTIONS FOR COLLEcTIVE AC TION (1990)(discussing various examples of selforganizing and self-governing common property regimes).
55. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
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called choses in action, are obviously regarded as property. Indeed,
from the perspective of the dominant nominalist theory, these interests seem to have "enough" of the attributes of property to qualify for
consideration as property: they are transferable during life and on
death, they can be pledged as collateral, they are protected against
state expropriation, and so forth.
In one sense, it is difficult to say that bank accounts, bonds, etc.
represent resources as to which the owner has the right to exclude
others. These interests are not really rights in specific resources at
all. Rather, they are abstract claims that can be converted ("cashed")
into specific resources. At one time, such interests were always embodied in some kind of chattel such as a piece of minted metal or a
certificate, in which case one could point to a physical thing with respect to which the interest holder could exercise a right to exclude
others. But today, often as not these interests exist only on the hard
drive of some computer, and the person deemed to be the holder of
these interests has no direct access to that computer. Thus, it may
seem that the holder of these interests does not exercise any kind of
gatekeeper function with respect to these interests.
But the paradox here is apparent only. The holders of bank accounts, bonds, and stocks may not be able to exercise any managerial
control over these resources, but that does not matter, because there is
nothing here to manage. These interests have no intrinsic value as
resources. The only value reflected in these interests is their exchange value-the fact that they can be converted into resources
which do have intrinsic value.5 6 And their exchange value is fully protected by the law against interference by others. These interests are
protected by criminal rules against theft and by civil actions for misappropriation, fraud, etc. These legal rules function in a manner directly parallel to the laws against trespass that protect land and the
actions for theft and replevin that protect chattels. In effect, therefore, the law of theft (together with its cognate civil actions) gives the
holders of interests in choses in action the right to exclude others from
interfering with the exchange value of these interests, and that is all
one needs to give them the status of property.
A more problematic set of interests are the so-called "new property" rights recognized in due process cases like Goldberg v. Kelly.57
The Supreme Court has ruled in these cases that a number of interests traditionally regarded as government privileges are in fact "property" for purposes of the procedural guarantees of due process. Among
the interests deemed to be constitutionally-protected property for
56. See HAI s, supra note 10, at 50-51 (discussing choses in action as "cashable
rights").
57. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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these purposes are welfare benefits, social security disability benefits,
government employment, and professional licenses.
Like choses in action, the interests protected as new property are
abstract claims on resources. In other respects, however, they have
almost none of the incidents traditionally associated with property
rights. Unlike choses in action, they are not transferable. Moreover,
the holder of such an interest has no right to transfigure it or to pledge
it as collateral. Indeed, the Court has held that the entitlements protected as new property may be abolished outright by the government,
and that this gives rise to no claim for compensation. 5 8 In terms of
traditional estates, the closest analogy to new property would seem to
be a beneficial interest in a revocable spendthrift trust.
Nevertheless, with a little tweaking it may be possible to reconcile
the idea of new property with the fundamental notion that property
rests on the right to exclude others. Although Goldberg was quite
vague about what it is about welfare benefits that allows them to be
characterized as property, subsequent cases have ruled that "[tihe
hallmark of property [for procedural due process purposes] is an individual entitlement grounded in state law, which cannot be removed
except 'for cause." 5 9 Although at first blush this seems like an odd
definition of property, it can be read as reflecting a version of the core
insight that property means the right to exclude others from something of value. Here, the relevant "other" is the government (the donor). The Court is perhaps saying that if an individual has an
entitlement to government benefits which may not be taken away by
the government without a finding of cause, then, as long the entitlement program continues to exist, the individual has the right to block
("exclude") the government from taking the entitlement unless and
until this condition precedent (the finding of cause) has been satisfied.
Of course, this is a bit of stretch, and it may be more honest simply
to admit that the new property cases are outliers. Goldberg and its
progeny are clearly decisions designed to expand the scope of due process protection for instrumental ends. Perhaps in this context we
should just admit that the concept of property has been fudged, and
not try too strenuously to assimilate the resulting anomaly to the
larger pattern discernible in the jurisprudence. That pattern, as
should be evident, is an impressive one, and provides substantial inductive support for the proposition that the right to exclude is the sine
qua non of property.

58. See Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987); Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to
Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41 (1986).
59. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430 (1982); see also Memphis
Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978).
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SOME QUALIFICATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

In closing, let me note a few qualifications of the thesis propounded
in this Essay, together with some implications.
First, in arguing that the right to exclude others is essential to the
institution of property, I am not suggesting anything about how extensive or unqualified this right must or should be. It is often observed,
on behalf of the majority of property law scholars who are resolute
nominalists, that the right to exclude is "not absolute."60 Blackstone's
stirring talk of the "sole and despotic dominion" of the property owner
is ridiculed as a caricature of reality. 6 1 And indeed, there is no question but that Blackstone's statement is hyperbolic. But the thesis here
is not that property requires a certain quantum of exclusion rights. It
is simply that to the extent one has the right to exclude, then one has
property; conversely, to the extent one does not have exclusion rights,
one does not have property.
This qualification has some important implications for our understanding of the institution of property. It suggests that although property has a certain essential characteristic, the institution of property
itself is not an either-or proposition. The world does not consist of
islands property, in the sense of large bundles of "full ownership"
rights, surrounded by a sea of unclaimed resources. Rather, it is a
complex tapestry of property rights of different sorts (private, public,
common) with different types and degrees of exclusion rights being
exercised by different sorts of entities in different contexts. Once we
assimilate this perspective, even the fee simple absolute in land can be
seen as a qualified complex of exclusion rights, in which owners exercise relatively full exclusion rights with respect to certain kinds of intrusion (e.g., by strangers) but highly qualified or even nonexistent
exclusion rights with respect to other kinds of intrusions (e.g., lowlevel nuisances).62 This perspective does not mean that property as
an institution has "disintegrated;"63 it simply means it has been
brought into sharper focus.
60. See, e.g., C.B. Macpherson, Liberal-Democracyand Property,in PROPERTY: MANsTRE i AND CRrrxcAL PosrrioNs, supra note 7, at 199, 201; Joseph William
Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 622 (1988).
61. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTs TALxC IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DisCOURSE 23 (1991); Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 IowA L. REV. 277,
280-83 (1998). Carol Rose has recently analyzed Blackstone's "exclusivity axiom"
as "a rhetorical figure describing an extreme or ideal type rather than reality."
Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone's Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J.
601, 604 (1998). For a persuasive argument that Blackstone's himself did not
view property as an absolute right, see Robert P. Burns, Blackstone's Theory of
the "Absolute"Rights of Property, 54 U. CIN. L. REv. 67 (1985).
62. See Merrill, supra note 51, at 618.
63. Cf Grey, supra note 27, at 74 (arguing that "[t]he concept of property and the
institution of property have disintegrated").
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Second, the understanding that the right to exclude others is essential to the institution of property, in and of itself, has very few implications for questions of distributive justice. For one thing,
property, as I have defined it, is not coterminous with private property; it includes also public and common property. It may be true that
the greater the fraction of private property to total property in any
society, the more unequal the distribution of wealth will tend to be
(although the total wealth, the size of the pie, will also likely be
larger). But nothing I have said requires any particular ratio of private to total property. For another thing, the institution of property,
as I have defined it, is not coterminous with wealth. Wealth includes
many things, such as in personam contract rights and public goods,
which may not fall within the definition of property, because these
things do not confer on anyone the right to exclude others from particular resources. Any analysis of distributive justice should take as its
subject wealth, not property.
The fact that property is not coterminous with contract or with
wealth also has important implications for certain public law controversies. Five Justices of the Supreme Court recently concluded that
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment applies only to rights in
specific assets-roughly speaking, what I have defined as propertyand not to government action that imposes a general liability on someone, thereby reducing their wealth.6 4 If the Court follows through on
this understanding, it could result in a more compact domain for the
Takings Clause than many academics, preoccupied with questions of
distributive justice, have hoped (or feared).6 5 On the other hand, the
Court has sometimes assumed rather facilely that contract rights and
property rights are subject to equivalent protection under either the
Contract Clause or the Due Process Clause. 6 6 A more precise understanding of property may call this into question too.
V. CONCLUSION
I have argued in this essay that property means the right to exclude others from valued resources, no more and no less. This is not a
novel idea. It can be found in Blackstone and Bentham, was reasserted by Felix Cohen, and has recently been discovered again by a
64. See Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 2131 (1998). The five include Justice
Kennedy, who concurred in the judgment and dissented in part, see id. at 215458; and four Justices in dissent, speaking through Justice Breyer. See id. at
2161-64.
65. See Thomas W. Merrill, Compensation and the Interconnectednessof Property,25
ECOLOGY L.Q. 327, 346-49 (1998).
66. See, e.g., United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 873-88 (1996)(discussing
interchangeably, in context of breach of contract action, precedents under Contract Clause and Due Process Clause).
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new generation of philosopher-lawyers operating in the English tradition.67 But this truth was obscured by the Legal Realists, with their
metaphor of the bundle of rights.
The objective of the Realists, no doubt, was to deconstruct and
dethrone property in order to facilitate the substitution of public for
private property. The Realist project of denigrating private property
has ebbed considerably in recent years. But the befogging metaphor
of the bundle of rights lives on in American law schools. It is time to
return to a clearer understanding of property, if only to facilitate moving on to a new set of issues regarding this ancient and ubiquitous
institution.

67. See supra note 10.

